I have touched upon this subject in other posts (e.g., Bear cognition – can object manipulation promote sociality?; Could there be a minimum threshold and a maximum threshold to the need by animal species to interact with others?).
As I have stated before, I do not attempt to denounce the usefulness of the concept of sociality in current wildlife biology.
Sociality is mainly viewed as the formation of cooperative (and often affiliative) groups the basic unit of which are pairs (parents).
Such groups may be formed on the base of kinship but not necessarily.
Thus, social species are species that rely on some type of cooperation (cooperative breeding, cooperative foraging, cooperative defense) and that consist of at least two adult individuals.
Mothers (or fathers) who raise their offspring alone are typically not considered to be social species (unless the offspring remain in the family unit after having reached independence and become a fully functional participants to important adult life strategies).
It should be noted that pairing up during the mating season (without further investment in the care for offspring on behalf of both parents) is not considered social behaviour in its cooperative context.
Species that are not social, are not asocial, either.
They still interact with conspecifics and some of these interactions are not hostile.
Short-term, transient group or pair formations can also be observed even in non-social species but these are not species that predominantly rely on social bonds and social investments.
They are often called solitary species.
Solitary species that are also territorial (respective to all conspecifics or to the conspecifics of their own sex), have the least likelihood to engage in social interactions with individuals who are not their offspring.
I believe that this concept is valid and it allows to make general comparisons.
It offers a reference point from which deviations can be assessed.
The studies of sociality (from the ecological perspective) are very important because social species rely on sociality in order to survive and to reproduce.
Thereby, their social life is crucial in determining their needs and their preferences.
However, from the behavioural and cognitive perspective, I think we might benefit from reviewing our perceptions of sociality because they might have been rooted in our own assumptions (derived from our own culture) of what ‘social’ means.
For example, we associate sociality with interactions that are mutualistic (and thereby we exclude non-living things or plants from the concept of sociality).
In our view, sociality is also tolerant, friendly, polite, based on cooperation, bonding, altruism and many such ‘positive attachments and services’.
Meanwhile, many emotional, cognitive, behavioural aspects that are involved in affiliative social interactions, are also involved in competitive and even predatory interactions.
Our competitors and our predators can shape our genetics as well as our choices in homeplace and lifestyle.
The emotions and reasoning behind the avoidance of our ‘enemies’ can be as strong as those behind the attraction to our ‘friends’.
Ultimately, in many cases, a thorough understanding has to be formed about the competitor or the predator which equals or even surpasses that which we form about our allies.
Finally, there could be such thing as social interactions with oneself.
For example, when we interact with others, on some level, we are constantly learning who we are, as well, because these interactions cannot occur outside of our perception, emotion, intellect.
Thus, in order to be able to engage in social interactions (to perceive and to respond appropriately), we must be able to form an understanding based on our reactions and cognitive processes (but also on instinctual responses which are reactions on a physical level – the information processing by our bodies without our direct and immediate involvement).
There might be species that prefer to learn about their own instincts, emotions, perceptions etc. through interacting with the outside world.
But there might also be species that are introspective.
This is a somewhat bold claim because it is customarily assumed that animals are largely ‘actors’ and ‘reactors’, i.e., their experiences are based on stimuli that they create or that they receive.
It is unusual to think of introspective capacities in other species (the ability to act and react to processes that are not external to oneself but that are observed or stimulated within oneself).
However, I believe there are introspective animals because introspection is a state that is closely linked to self-examination (e.g., health self-check).
I think that introspection is derived from mating, gestation and competing.
Females of some species can deny advances by males if they do not perceive their body condition supportive of inception (an introspectively gained conclusion).
The onset of mating also sometimes tends to precede actual oestrus and therefore the female is likely following her hormonal states.
Females are likely following the fetus development and monitoring their own responses such as body mass, activity level, nutritional status etc.
While fetus is, arguably, an internally external subject, the link between the mother and the fetus before parturition wholly depends on the mother’s state and the mother has to follow her own state in order to ensure proper fetus development (high level motivation).
Last but not least, individuals are known to contest other individuals or to make other types of decisions (e.g., when to attempt a dominance position takeover, when to fledge etc.) based on their internal state which must be reflected upon.
These are foundations of introspective interactions (where the individual provides their own stimuli).
For these and other reasons, I believe that sociality, as a behavioural and cognitive determinant, should be viewed more broadly (although we might select terms other than ‘sociality’ to describe these phenomena in order to avoid confusion; but my objective is to demonstrate that they are, too, social and might impact social potential or perhaps even evolution of sociality in species).
I began reconsidering sociality after reading many texts in folklore and mythology where objects are hardly inanimate (‘inanimate objects’ are largely a concept of Western culture), plants can communicate, gods have adversaries that are sometimes more important than their closest allies and relations and death (‘predation’) is not always regarded as an evil brought upon by beings hostile to us.
I will try to provide examples how these types of interactions are complex, can be beneficial and, on some level, even cooperative etc.
Before I proceed, I would like to explain why I find it important to address the broader nature of sociality.
I think that if we consider sociality to be inclusive of objects, plants, onself, competitors, predators and other categories of individuals (representing conspecifics or other species) whom animals are aware of, whom they notice, adapt to, respond to (also internally) etc., we must recognize that these interactions might be supported by similar mechanisms that are used in the sociality in its traditional sense (appraising the other, adjusting to the other, provoking responses in the other, benefitting intellectually or genetically from the other etc.).
If that is so, animals might be limited in how many interactions they can support in their current state of evolution.
Thus, animals that have to constantly interact with a great number of other species that are almost as complex (or equally complex or superior) as they are, might find it more difficult to evolve actual sociality (in the traditional, group living sense) because they are already exerting a lot of strength and energy in maintaining their interactions with e.g., prey, scavengers, neighbours etc.
This is especially if the interactions are not ‘automatic’ (and even if they are instinctual, they still claim energy resources and place strain on one’s body) but they have to be assessed in each separate occasion and even with respect to each separate individual.
In such situations, the animals might be faced with a choice.
If they evolve group living, the cooperative defense might reduce the amount of non-conspecific interactions (or improve foraging reducing interactions with objects, or they can reduce the time one dedicates to introspection because many cues of one’s state become socially reflected, i.e., they are perceived by the group and communicated back the individual externally).
However, before it happens, the species must invest in ‘laying the foundations’ of sociality.
In its early form, many of the social (group, cooperative) interactions might be chaotic and in flux and not at all as ‘relaxing’.
Therefore, if the species is too greatly invested in interactions with non-cooperative entities (in the traditional sense of ‘cooperation’), they might lack the resources needed to begin developing sociality.
Sociality might only arise naturally, under such conditions, if the benefits are immediately greater than the costs (if extra energy can be gained and additional rest can be achieved compared to solitary lifestyle).
Additionally, some species might not prefer abandoning their complex interactions with other species, their high level introspection or object-manipulations.
This would be true if the social interactions with one’s group are not as interesting or pleasant, or rewarding as interactions with non-social entities.
Many ‘social hormones’ are probably also evolved over time (their intensity depends on the level of affiliation and thereby without affiliation – which has to be achieved first – they would not provide gratification).
It is possible that animals might begin considering social lifestyle if they have had extreme experiences (e.g., social help during high stress periods or prolonged and somewhat abnormal high density living states without enormous costs that can arise, for example, during small rodent population peaks or mast years etc.).
If high density living conditions have proven to result in high stress (unpleasant associations), the animal might not be as interested in switching between the current mode of challenges and growth, and entertainment and the ‘uthopian communion’.
Also, some species might be defined as supersocial if they achieve social living with conspecifics while maintaining very complex, diverse, intense, dynamic, real-time-situation-assessment interactions with non-conspecifics.
There might be a distinction between social species that have developed sociality in order to reduce the intensity of interactions with non-conspecifics (or plants and objects) and social species that have assumed social living as the next skill level (first having mastered non-conspecific interactions).
There might be also the reverse mechanism where sociality has evolved first and then the species have begun to find resources to invest in diversifying their interactions with the rest of the world or in developing introspection.
Some might argue – while it is somewhat understandable how one might not be unwilling to give up positive interactions with objects and plants or to spend time gaining awareness of oneself, it is hardly imaginable that animals would prefer interactions with competitors or (even more outrageously) predators to nice, friendly cooperation with one’s own kind.
However, we do not know how animals perceive the world including its dangers and nuisances.
I certainly do not think anybody wants to die or become injured or to suffer loss, or to starve etc.
At the same time, we have evolved to handle these risks.
Accordingly, these risks do not come without certain ‘positive feedbacks’ about who we are and what this world is for us.
If we can scare off competitors, it makes us feel empowered and sharing this sense of empowerment might ‘dilute’ its effects, on an individual level (we did it together as a group).
I am not saying that animals want to ‘hog success’.
I am saying that an individual who has relied on themselves to survive or to raise their young, might find it difficult and scary to feel ‘any less than mighty’.
If the survival of one’s offspring depends on one’s determination, self-reliance, independent decision-making etc., it might not be easy to begin to rely on others.
Similarly, some animals who take care of their offspring in solitary capacity, have evolved a very tight bond with their offspring that is not readily given up.
Animals who have flee predators might use this as a health care self-check mechanism and they might develop unwanted physical conditions if they are no longer singled out by the predator (because reliance on group vigilance is likely related to focusing not one’s own vulnerability respective to the predator but respective to the rest of the group and such refocusing might be confusing in the beginning).
These are only some of the reasons why competition and predation can involve positive experiences and states as well as why it is not easy to ‘give them up’.
I will discuss these ‘alternative types of sociality’ in other posts dedicated to particular species.
However, I would like to list a range of rationales behind my reasoning.
1
Objects and plants can teach us skills that not unlike the skills needed in social, cooperative interactions.
We learn to differentiate between situations when we should be patient vs. assertive and we also practise these behavioural skills.
In order to achieve a foraging objective, the individual has to recognize the properties of the object and objects are not all alike.
Some of them have qualities that provoke certain emotional states and that call for certain manipulative strategies in order to achieve our objectives in the interaction.
It is easily said that objects have ‘characters’ and that in order to have handled the object efficiently, we need to recognize these qualities and to adapt our responses and attitudes accordingly.
We need to practise our approaches until they become embedded in our behavioural range as well as until our manner of interacting with the object or the plant brings mutual benefit (for example, we should not deplete our forage which is beneficial for the plant, as well, especially, if our herbivory also ensures dispersal of its propagules).
We also have to exercise caution because misinterpretation of cues or mishandling may cause injury and even death.
We need to be able to recognize plants that send us warning signals (bright colours, light emissions, certain scents) as well as plants that send us invitation signals (fleshy fruit, attractive smell, attractive colours).
2
A characteristic part of social living is the dominance structure which, in social units, ensures order, cohesion and resource distribution within the group.
While competition with conspecifics is not regarded as beneficial but rather as restrictive, it is also true that, from the population perspective, competition can ensure regulatory mechanisms in use of habitat and its resources.
Neighbours set boundaries that restrict home ranges and reproduction.
Competition within non-territorial settings ensures niche separation between individuals (and also between species) leading to sustainable resource use.
This might or might not be perceived by individuals but individuals still have to observe the dominance hierarchies constantly evaluating their own claims and restrictions.
Competition with other species might be even more cognitive-demanding that competition with conspecifics because one has to assess their needs and limits with respect to individuals who are unlike oneself.
Signals and signs of weakness and strength as well as indications of possibilities of temporary coexistence have to be calculated in dynamically changing situations.
These are skills that are needed also in social groups because social groups are never structures in which hierarchies are set for life.
In social groups, however, they are often decided through kinship bounds (leading to lower aggression levels) and through non-threatening ‘role-playing’ (e.g., play).
Communication outside of social groups with conspecifics or other species might have higher stakes and it might be challenging because one has to make decisions based on judgements acquired more distantly (through inspection of scent-marks, through visual displays, through auditory clues) while within groups physical proximity might facilitate the evaluation.
3
Predation is rarely viewed as promotive of one’s chances.
However, it is known that predation can ensure the health of one’s population and a constant mechanism through which an individual can follow their own fitness status.
Predation is a strong selective force that can favour one genes over others shaping the morphology, behaviour and overall direction that the evolution of the species assumes.
In some respects, predators affect the characteristics of a species to a degree as pronounced as mating affects it.
Predation is a type of cooperation that also drives the individual toward bettering its chances at survival constantly through active avoidance of mortality.
In some mythologies, gods have their antagonists and gods claim their powers through these antagonists.
The constant battle allows gods to evolve their skills and to further the creation in a direction that is non-stochastic but deliberately avoiding the state of entropy (perfecting energy investments, directing the vast potential at promoting life and constantly bettering oneself).
It is easily seen that competitors and predators are not cooperative allies in the pleasant and direct manner that is appreciated from a perspective of individual fate and daily ordeals.
It is not known whether individual animals perceive the benefits of regulation and species advancement that competitors and predators… impose on them.
The interaction and ‘cooperation’ between the individual and their foe is not directed toward common good and is not achieved in a uniting manner.
But through departing into the opposite direction (avoiding death which is sought by the predator) or through overtaking the other (establishing dominance over the competitor), in many ways, the two involved parties are headed toward a more balanced, healthier future that is life-affirming.
Predator, similarly, knows their prey as thoroughly as they know their social allies.
Many of these skills are very similar that are necessary to carry out social existence.
Society is a structure that has its rules which are accepted because they allow one to profit.
Competition and predation is a similar but despotic structure which the individual has to accept but it can also allow one to profit (e.g., through not depleting their own resources in the long-term and through forcibly exploring one’s potential that can direct one’s evolution).
I believe that animals are not merely seeking comfort and security but they also need challenges and discoveries (as long as basic survival can be ensured and their offspring is safe).
I would not be surprised if animals perceived their relationships with adversaries not as fearful and hateful but as mystical and binding to some greater powers governing existence of everyone involved.
All in all, I think that behavioural and cognitive sociality is not limited to allies and that the evolution of social lifestyle has to account for other types of interactions that engage similar cognitive faculties and that are energy and time demanding.
In this post, I have not even touched upon mutualism or one-sided symbiosis (that is neutral or parasitic toward the other individual) observed in interspecific relations (including group-individual and group-group interactions).
Notes by Ieva 